The Battle of Saratoga was a turning point in the American Revolution. Leaders like John Burgoyne, Horatio Gates, and Benedict Arnold, with thousands of valiant men, fought in a drama that would change the world.
By Mark D. Harris, MD, MPH, MBA, MDiv, ThM, PhD, DBA
Background: The Road to Saratoga
After fighting side by side to defeat the French and Indians (1756-1763), Britain and her American colonies drifted apart. Laboring under a heavy debt, Parliament increased taxation and control over the Americans. The Quebec Act (1774) was intended to build support for Britain among the Catholic French Canadians, institute the French system of civil law,[1] and limit colonial migration into the Ohio Valley. However, it infuriated English colonists. But it, and other “intolerable acts,” provided the tipping point into revolution.
Before Congress even declared America to be a new nation (4 July 1776), American rebels captured Fort Ticonderoga (10 May 1775), Crown Point, Fort St. Johns (17 Sep to 3 Nov 1775), and Montreal in the early months of the conflict. US General Richard Montgomery commanded about 1000 militia through the St. Lawrence River north to Quebec. Moving primarily by water, they brought most of the artillery and supplies. US General Benedict Arnold began taking about 1000 militia through the wilderness of Maine, from the Kennebec River to the Chaudière River. Having started in July, Arnold’s force lost about 500 men to starvation, desertion, expiring enlistments, and disease (smallpox). Montgomery’s force diminished to 700 by expiring enlistments.
Arnold and Montgomery linked up just south of Quebec on 3 Dec. After an unsuccessful assault, Arnold besieged Quebec until May 1776. With only 1200 militia, Montgomery and Arnold did not have enough men to defeat Gen Guy Carleton’s 1800 regulars, marines, militia, and Indians defending Quebec’s fortifications. The leaders built their camps and consolidated their forces, but with most of the enlistments of their remaining men expiring on 31 Dec, they decided to storm the city. Montgomery led a charge early and was quickly killed. Arnold moved into the lower city but could not secure it. Many Americans were captured. Nonetheless, with only 500 remaining men, Arnold maintained the siege of Quebec until April 1776.
In preparation for a British invasion of the colonies from Canada in 1776, forty ships and roughly 13,000 troops — 9,000 British regulars and 4,000 German mercenaries — arrived in Quebec from London in early May. The reinforcements also included General John Burgoyne, who was to be second in command to Carleton. Friction between the leaders was evident, as was the normal friction of war. In one case, a unit of Hessian mercenaries lost their boots in Germany, and some enterprising quartermaster sent dancing shoes instead.
Carleton pursued Arnold and the retreating Americans at the Battle of the Cedars, Battle of Quinze-Chênes (15 oaks), and scattered raids. Arnold abandoned Montreal and Fort St. John’s but stopped in Crown Point and Ticonderoga in July 1776. Carleton brought his 9,000-man army to Fort St. Johns, but stopped since he needed a fleet to move his army down Lake Champlain. Arnold did the same.
Battle of Valcour Island (11 Oct 1776)
By Sep 1776, the British had one ship sloop (22 guns), two schooners (14, 12), one radeau (18), one gundalow (7), and 28 gunboats (1×28). The Americans had one sloop (12 guns), two schooners (12, 8), four row galleys (10, 11, 8, 6), and eight gundalows (3×8). The British were clearly superior, both in firepower and in seamanship, as they had professional sailors while the Americans used whoever was around, farmers, laborers, and soldiers.
Arnold, a merchant sea captain in civilian life, deployed his fleet in a line stretching from Valcour Island on Lake Champlain to the New York shore of the Lake on 11 Oct 1776.[2] The British fleet sailed with the prevailing wind close to the Vermont shore but could not make the turn around the southern tip of Valcour. They were downwind and could not turn into the wind to travel north against the American fleet. Arnold, therefore, succeeded in his plan to prevent England from attacking with his whole force.
The fight was severe, but the British superiorities in numbers, guns, and seamanship prevailed. Further, Carleton placed Indians on the east New York shore and on Valcour Island, thus subjecting the American’s to continual snipping. Just after midnight on 12 Oct, Arnold slipped his fleet past the British line. Eventually, the Royal Navy gave chase. They sank or captured almost all of the American ships.
The pivotal naval engagement at Valcour Island on Lake Champlain illustrated both American audacity and British caution. Though most of the American fleet was destroyed, Benedict Arnold’s determined resistance persuaded General Sir Guy Carleton to abandon his 1776 invasion, postponing the decisive southern push until the following year.
British Grand Strategy, Spring 1777
London operated on a set of assumptions that would prove flawed. British planners believed the majority of the colonies were placid and that only New England was truly restive. They expected a large loyalist uprising to offset British numerical disadvantages. Despite their experience at Bunker Hill, many British doubted that the Americans could fight effectively. It was commonly assumed that a three-pronged convergence on Albany would sever New England from the other colonies, breaking the American will to continue.
Burgoyne’s plan called for three forces to meet at Albany. General Burgoyne would drive south from Canada with 8,000 regulars, German mercenaries, and Indians. Brigadier General Barry St. Leger would move from Montreal along the Mohawk River with 1,600 troops and Indian allies. General William Howe, commanding 15,500 men in New York, was expected to push north up the Hudson to complete the encirclement.
Howe’s plan differed. He believed that capturing Philadelphia would force Washington into a decisive engagement and end the war. Howe intended to assist Burgoyne only after Philadelphia was taken. Burgoyne and St. Leger, however, assumed Howe would move immediately northward. This misalignment of intent — never fully resolved by London, including the Colonial secretary (Major-General George Germain), the Prime Minister (Lord North), or King George III — would doom the campaign before it began.
Burgoyne undermined his boss, Carleton, in letters to London. He accused Carleton of laziness and cowardice in his decision to retreat in 1776 rather than pushing forward to Ticonderoga. London listened, making Carleton the governor of Canada but removing his command of the British Army there. Germain gave that command to Burgoyne instead.
The American Situation, Spring 1777
Congress divided the colonial military into three regions, north, middle, and south. General George Washington commanded the main American army of 13,600 at Morristown, New Jersey, and served as commander in chief for all colonial ground forces. His main camp was positioned 84 miles north of Philadelphia and 32 miles east of New York City.
Generals Horatio Gates and Philip Schuyler alternated command of the Northern Department based in Albany. Colonel Peter Gansevoort held Fort Stanwix with 1,500 regulars and militia. General Israel Putnam guarded the Hudson River highlands with 3,000 troops, and General Arthur St. Clair commanded 4,000 at Fort Ticonderoga. As on the British side, all numbers fluctuated continuously due to short enlistments, desertions, and the ebb and flow of militia service. The southern department boasted a small continental army in Charleston SC and scattered small detachments elsewhere.
The British Campaign from Canada – 1777
Burgoyne’s army left Fort St. Johns on 14 Jun. The expedition was expected to travel mainly over water, so there were few wagons, horses, and other draft animals available to move a large amount of equipment and supplies over land. Seeing the problem, Carleton and Burgoyne tried to get more carts and wagons, but could not. Without proper transportation, the British army experienced shortages of food and ammunition, which plagued them throughout the entire campaign
Col St. Leger’s expedition of 750 left Montreal on 23 Jun. He was joined by almost 1,000 Indians enroute.
The Fall of Fort Ticonderoga, July 1777
Fort Ticonderoga was considered impregnable, a “Gibraltar of the North.” It was defended by 4,000 Continental Army soldiers and had plentiful equipment (like artillery) and supplies. The fort was built and sited well, though it was a little run-down from lack of maintenance.
St. Clair had positioned artillery at the fort of Ticonderoga and on Mount Independence, on the Vermont side of Lake Champlain. Mt Hope stood to the north. However, if the defenders lost Mount Hope, the attacker could cross the western branch of the lake and take Mount Defiance — the tallest terrain feature in the area. Mount Defiance was 840 ft tall and heavily wooded, so St. Clair did not believe that anyone could pull artillery up the steep slopes. He had been warned of this critical vulnerability by Polish engineer Tadeusz Kościuszko, and John Trumbull, Anthony Wayne, and a recovering Benedict Arnold climbed to the top to prove it could be done. St Clair also felt his forces were too thin to defend the fort while also holding the high ground, so he left Mount Defiance unoccupied.
Burgoyne advanced on the west, NY side of Lake Champlain. The German commander Riedesel moved on the east, VT side. The British occupied the undefended fort at Crown Point. Despite the danger from Mount Defiance, St Clair abandoned Mt Hope (2 Jul). The British occupied it (3 Jul).
Burgoyne immediately saw an opportunity, and he took it. On July 4th, British engineers placed an artillery battery atop Mount Defiance, instantly rendering the entire American position, all of Fort Ticonderoga, untenable. Finally realizing his plight, St. Clair ordered the Ticonderoga abandoned. His 4,000 men slipped away during the night of July 5th. Burgoyne occupied Ticonderoga unopposed the following morning. The Americans left behind enormous quantities of food, ammunition, cannon, tents, cattle, and other supplies. The bridge and boom designed to slow British naval movement proved equally useless once the fort fell — Burgoyne was not delayed.
The British pursued the Americans south and east and met stiffer than expected resistance in the battles of Hubbardton (7 Jul), Skenesboro (Whitehall), and Fort Anne (8 Jul). The Americans slowed the British advance by felling trees across roads, destroying bridges, etc. The northern American army retreated towards Saratoga.
Burgoyne faced a decision of how to get to Albany. He could move his entire army back to Skenesboro, embark them, and sail most of the way to the Hudson River and then to Albany. Alternatively, he could ship only the heavy artillery and march the bulk of his forces down to Fort Edward. Burgoyne chose the latter. The British marched overland south to Fort Edward, arriving on 29 July, and consuming a huge number of supplies. They began an aggressive foraging campaign to get carts, wagons, horses, oxen, donkeys, and food.
The Mohawk Valley Campaign
While Burgoyne pressed south, St. Leger executed the western prong of Burgoyne’s grand strategy. The Mohawk River Valley was a cauldron of violence in 1775, with roughly 7,500 European settlers caught between warring tribal factions — Mohawks, Ottawa, Fox, Mississauga, Chippewa, and Ojibwa — loyalists, and rebels. St. Leger arrived at Oswego on Lake Ontario on July 25th with about 700 regulars and was soon joined by around 800 Indian allies (many Seneca). His intelligence was badly out of date: a Montreal briefing from late June had described Fort Stanwix as a dilapidated post with barely 60 defenders. In reality, COL Peter Gansevoort held it with 750 regulars and militia. Gansevoort’s men had created obstacles along Wood Creek, slowing St. Leger’s approach. Still, he invested Fort Stanwix on August 2nd.
The Battle of Oriskany
The Battle of Oriskany decimated the Americans. On August 6th, General Nicholas Herkimer led a relief column of 700 New York militia and 70 Oneida Indians toward the fort. Joseph Brant, an Indian leader supporting Britain, had received word from his sister, Molly, who was living at Canajoharie, that an American relief column was marching up the Mohawk Valley. Armed with this intelligence, Sir John Butler deployed 500 loyalists and Indians to ambush the column in a ravine six miles southeast of Fort Stanwix. The Senecas attacked prematurely, but the Americans were still caught by surprise. In mortal danger, Herkimer dispatched a messenger asking for a detachment to sortie out of Fort Stanwix. Badly wounded early in the fighting, he directed the battle from beneath a tree while smoking his pipe. An early thunderstorm interrupted the engagement, and the native warriors interpreted it as a spiritual sign to withdraw. American losses were severe: 385 killed, 50 wounded, and 30 captured. The British and their allies lost roughly 100 total.
Receiving Herkimer’s request, Lieutenant Colonel Marinus Willett led 250 men from Fort Stanwix in a sortie against the unprotected Indian and Loyalist camps south of the British lines. The raiders drove away the few remaining occupants, took prisoners, and returned with wagonloads of supplies and equipment. When word of the raid reached the Indians and Loyalists at Oriskany, nearly all of them broke off the fight — a significant blow to St. Leger’s combat power.
The Siege of Fort Stanwix
The fort was well-designed and well-maintained, so British progress was slow. The British had two 6-pounders, two 3-pounders, and four coehorn mortars, too small to break down fortress walls as fast as needed. The Americans had more cannon, including three 9-pounders, four 6-pounders, four 3-pounders, and four 4-2/5 caliber mortar Royals. The English not only had to face counter-battery fire, but they also had to dig sapper trenches towards Fort Stanwix to get their small cannon close enough to really damage the walls.
Arnold’s Relief Column and the Relief of the Fort.
General Schuyler sent Benedict Arnold with 700 militia to relieve the siege. By August 20th, Arnold was at Fort Dayton, 32 miles away. He then executed one of the campaign’s more colorful stratagems: he released a captured loyalist, instructing the man — through a combination of persuasion and threat — to spread word that a relief column of 3,000 men was nearly at the gates of the fort. St. Leger, already having lost 200 Indian warriors after the raid and facing the threatened departure of more, was now confronted with a large relief force. After a council of war, St Leger broke the siege on August 22nd and retreated to Oswego on Lake Ontario.
St. Leger later discovered Arnold’s ruse while crossing Lake Oneida, but rather than reversing course, he informed Burgoyne that he had decided to join him instead. He arrived at Ticonderoga on September 29th, by which time Burgoyne was already trapped at Saratoga.
British Difficulties, August 1777
By August, while camped at Fort Edward, Burgoyne’s army was in serious trouble. He was only fifteen miles north of Saratoga. Burgoyne lacked powder, shot, wadding, canvas, and food for both his 7,000 remaining troops and the 400 camp followers — women and children — who accompanied the army. Many of his Indian allies had departed, disgusted by the handling of the Jane McCrea affair and Burgoyne’s general approach to Indian auxiliaries. Their departure was not merely a morale problem; it stripped Burgoyne of his scouts and flank guards, leaving him tactically blind in unfamiliar wilderness terrain. Meanwhile, Generals Schuyler and Gates were successfully raising militia throughout New England and New York, steadily swelling rebel numbers.
Battle of Bennington, August 16th
Burgoyne’s supply problems were severe and unrelenting. His supply lines grew longer with every mile south. He never had enough draft animals and wagons. He didn’t even have enough teamsters to drive the carts he had. Burgoyne had expected hundreds of wagons and draft animals to help him once he entered New York. They did not come.
On August 11th, Burgoyne dispatched 800 Hessians under Lieutenant Colonel Friedrich Baum to forage and capture a lightly defended rebel supply depot at Bennington, Vermont, 45 miles southeast of Fort Edward. Without adequate Indian scouts, the British had no idea that 1,500 New Hampshire militia under General John Stark were assembling in the area. Baum arrived on the 14th, and both sides constructed opposing fortifications northwest of the town. Heavy rain delayed action until the 16th. Baum reportedly expected the inexperienced Americans to retreat before him. Instead, Stark’s militia attacked at three in the afternoon on 16 Aug and enveloped Baum’s entire force. The Hessian commander was killed and his force crushed.
Late in the day, Lieutenant Colonel Heinrich Breymann arrived with 600 Hessian reinforcements, only to be met by Lieutenant Samuel Safford with 350 Green Mountain Boys. Total British, Hessian, loyalist, and Iroquois losses at Bennington came to 207 dead and 700 captured. American losses were 30 dead and 40 wounded — a lopsided result that further depleted Burgoyne’s already strained force and supplies.
The American Situation, September 1777
After considerable political maneuvering, General Horatio Gates replaced Schuyler in command of the Northern Department. Most of the garrison from Fort Stanwix marched southeast to join him. Washington detached Daniel Morgan’s Rifle Corps — up to 500 crack marksmen — from his main army and sent them north. By September 19th, Gates had assembled 10,000 troops in prepared defensive positions just south of Saratoga, with Albany a mere 45 miles away. American victories had energized militia recruitment north of Fort Edward, and General Stark kept 1,000 militia at Bennington. Burgoyne, meanwhile, abandoned Forts Edward, Anne, and several others to concentrate his main force — a decision that freed British troops for battle but severed his lines of communication and allowed Americans to move in behind him, blocking any future retreat.
It is also worth noting that much of the cannon, muskets, and other combat equipment now equipping the American forces had been supplied by France, whose covert support was becoming increasingly consequential.
The Battles of Saratoga
Freeman’s Farm, September 19th
Burgoyne marched south from Ft. Edward, starting in August. By early Sept, his army was on the east side of the Hudson River. He crossed to the west side of the Hudson just north of Saratoga from 13-15 Sep. By 18 Sep, Gates and Burgoyne’s armies were 4 miles apart.
Arnold and Morgan initiated a reconnaissance in force against the British right on the morning of the 19th. British troops, conducting their own reconnaissance in three columns, advanced toward the Americans. By three in the afternoon, the entire British right flank was engulfed in heavy fighting. Though the British held the field at day’s end — technically claiming a victory — the cost was devastating. Nearly 600 British soldiers were killed, wounded, or captured; more than 300 Americans suffered the same fate.
Assault on Fort Ticonderoga, September 18th.
Even as the armies sparred at Freeman’s Farm, General Benjamin Lincoln and Colonel John Brown led 2,000 militia north from Bennington. They recaptured Skenesboro and Mount Independence, freed 100 American prisoners, and captured 300 British soldiers. Their 500-man Ticonderoga detachment was too small to take the fortress city itself. Gates ordered Lincoln south; he arrived at Bemis Heights on September 29th, further reinforcing the American position.
Clinton’s Relief Expedition.
General Henry Clinton led 3,000 regulars north from New York toward the Hudson River highland forts and Albany. He captured several fortifications along the way but could not move fast enough or in sufficient strength to relieve Burgoyne.
Bemis Heights, October 7th. The second and decisive battle of the campaign sealed Burgoyne’s fate.
With Lincoln’s 2000 troops and a flood of militia, US forces at Saratoga increased to 20,000. Burgoyne had about 6,000 soldiers. Men and animals in the British army faced starvation, so Burgoyne sent a 1,700-man reconnaissance-in-force to probe colonial fortifications near Bemis Heights. Burgoyne did not intend for this to be the main attack, only a chance to harvest wheat and capture livestock. Finding two unharvested wheat fields, the British and Germans began harvesting the ripe wheat. American scouts discovered the movement and informed Gates. Gates sent his left wing under Arnold, led by Morgan, Learned, and Poor, to attack the British at Breymann’s and Balcarre’s Redoubts. American forces shattered the British effort and drove deep into Burgoyne’s defensive works. The British could not hold, and hopelessly outnumbered, they were driven back. Burgoyne attempted to withdraw but found his routes of retreat blocked
Having given up his supply lines north, Burgoyne found himself surrounded by American forces. The British had almost no food and ammunition left. Burgoyne sent messengers to ask for terms of surrender. Gates initially demanded unconditional surrender. The British commander still hoped that Clinton would save him, so he delayed negotiations. The British wanted the agreement to be called a “Convention” (rather than “Capitulation”) because a convention sounded less humiliating. By the time it was signed, Gates allowed everyone in the British army to be repatriated to Britain, provided they no longer fought in North America.[3] Burgoyne surrendered his entire army of roughly 6,000 men on October 17, 1777.
Results and Historical Significance
The consequences of Saratoga radiated far beyond the Hudson Valley. The battle demonstrated to the entire world — British, American, French, and otherwise — that American forces could fight on equal terms with a modern European army in open, conventional battle. This was the decisive proof that France and Spain had been waiting for.
France entered the war openly on the American side in February 1778, and Spain followed. The French alliance transformed the conflict from a colonial rebellion into a global war. Fighting spread to Europe, India, and the Caribbean, stretching British resources to the breaking point. The American victory at Yorktown in 1781 — the effective end of the war — would have been impossible without French support, and specifically without the French naval victory over the British fleet at the Battle of the Chesapeake that same year, which cut off Cornwallis from relief or escape.
The reverberations extended further still. The ideals animating the American Revolution contributed intellectual energy to the French Revolution of 1789 and the Napoleonic era that followed. Movements across South America and beyond drew inspiration from the demonstration that colonial peoples could successfully overthrow autocratic rule. Saratoga was not merely a turning point in a single war — it was a hinge moment in the history of the Atlantic world.
References
American History Central. “Saratoga Campaign, Summary, Facts, Significance, Revolutionary War.” American History Central, November 22, 2023. https://www.americanhistorycentral.com/entries/saratoga-campaign-1777/.
Atkinson, Rick. The British Are Coming: The War for America, 1775–1777. London: William Collins, 2019.
Chavez, Thomas E. Spain and the Independence of the United States: An Intrinsic Gift. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2003.
Clay, Steven E., and U.S. Army Combined Arms Center. Staff Ride Handbook for the Saratoga Campaign, 13 June to 8 November 1777. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, 2018.
Hibbert, Christopher. Redcoats and Rebels: The War for America, 1770–1781. Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Military, 2008.
Maloy, Mark. “The Saratoga Campaign.” American Battlefield Trust, September 1, 2021. https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/saratoga-campaign.
Weddle, Kevin J. The Compleat Victory: Saratoga and the American Revolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021.
[1] Replacing a British-style elected assembly with a French-style governor and council.
[2] Arnold’s dual role as both fleet and army commander placed him in rare historical company — George Monck (1608–1670) being one of the few others who commanded both.
[3] In the event, Congress repudiated Gate’s terms, and the “Convention Army” was held in America until after the war.
